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Abstract. By focusing on the practice of constitutional courts this paper aims to present a qualitative-analytical 
tool which could contribute to a better (self-)understanding and evaluation of constitutional adjudication. Since the 
specifi c nature and the very existence of constitutional review necessitates an a priori refl ection on the legitimacy, 
exact function and role of constitutional courts within the democratic system, a multidimensional model of 
democracy might give some insight into the theoretical background of the court’s decisions in this respect. This 
level of analysis focuses simply on the question of which ideal type of democracy might be inherent or envisioned 
in decisions taken by judges of constitutional courts.
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Mapping and qualifying different types of judicial reasoning from the point of view of 
constitutional interpretation is quite common in legal scholarship. Evaluating judicial 
reasoning by means of democratic theory is, however, a less explored research fi eld in spite 
of a clear normative demand for clarifying the role of constitutional courts within a 
democratic system. This is why analyzing the problem of judicial reasoning from the 
perspective of a multidimensional model of democracy might be a promising enterprise in 
achieving a better understanding of constitutional adjudication and its quality.
By focusing on the practice of constitutional courts this paper aims to present a 
qualitative-analytical tool which could contribute to a better (self-)understanding and 
evaluation of constitutional adjudication. Since the specifi c nature and the very existence of 
constitutional review necessitates an a priori refl ection on the legitimacy, exact function 
and role of constitutional courts within the democratic system, a multidimensional model of 
democracy might give some insight into the theoretical background of the court’s decisions 
in this respect.
This level of analysis focuses simply on the question of which ideal type of democracy 
might be inherent or envisioned in decisions taken by judges of constitutional courts.
Before entering upon the main topic we should make it clear, however, that the 
applicability of the analytical tool presented in this paper is rather limited. It should be 
underlined that the analytical tool is not apt for the study of all decisions of the constitutional 
courts. The scope of the scrutiny should be narrowed down to the relevant decisions through 
which we have an insight into the explicit or implicit self-understanding or role perception 
of the court and the judges. According to our interpretation judicial self-understanding 
should give, however, evidence on or at least contain elements which refer to the role of the 
court and judges within the system of democracy. Consequently, it is this moment where 
democratic theory and the question of judicial reasoning intertwine: judges and courts 
should locate themselves and their role within the system of democracy, the system of 
separation of powers and checks and balances.
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Furthermore this paper argues that the approach presented here might be expedient in 
two alternative ways. It might be applied as a normative theory or as an analytical tool.
Since quality assessments should have some standards, evaluations of judicial 
decisions based on a framework of democratic theory have normative implications. In this 
sense we assume that judicial reasoning is of higher quality if it provides some insights into 
the self-understanding of judges and courts: judges should make clear which model of 
democracy enumerated below they prefer. Without this evidence and signs it is unclear 
what kind of role they ascribe to the constitutional court. And this would be clearly a 
qualitatively less optimal case.
It does not matter whether these signs are explicit or implicit: the normative expectation 
is rather that these signs should be consistent throughout the time period a judge is in offi ce. 
By changing the composition of the court the self-understanding of the majority of judges 
could of course shift from one type of self-understanding to another type. But the question 
is whether individual judges are consistently representing one or another type of self-
understanding. This would make the constitutional adjudication more calculable and 
reliable.
But analyzing judges’ preferences in terms of their ideal types of democracy might be 
regarded also as an analytical tool which does not pretend, however, to explain the causes 
of a decision or detect the motivations behind the decisions.1 The analytical tool presented 
in this paper has only a descriptive function but the relevance of a descriptive tool, which 
clarifi es and maps by conceptualization, must not be underestimated. The signifi cance of 
the phase of conceptualization has been almost neglected in social science research in the 
last 30 years while a shift towards quantitative components of the research is clearly 
discernable.2 This paper will, nevertheless, contribute rather to the better understanding of 
constitutional reasoning and adjudication by connecting and relating some concepts and 
theories of democracy theory to constitutional adjudication. The job performed here might 
be labelled as conceptual mapping.3
The aspirations of this paper might be rather modest in one more aspect. Since no 
existing theoretical work deals in detail with the relationship of constitutional adjudication 
and various theories of democracy this paper purposes to sketch the outlines of a 
comprehensive study which could give an overview of the relationship of various 
democratic theories to the institution of constitutional courts and practice of constitutional 
adjudication. It should be stressed, however, that this paper is confi ned to delineate merely 
the contours of another comprehensive study which will be published in the near future. 
Consequently, for a more detailed overview readers should turn to an expanded version of 
this paper.4
1. LITERATURE OVERVIEW AND THEORETICAL APPROACH
Approaching constitutional adjudication from the perspective of the role perception of 
judges is a quite recent phenomenon. The legal model of judicial behavior, which apart 
from the US traditionally dominated the legal scholarship until most recently, claims that 
judges have a clear-cut and very simple role which is to be the mouth of the law. It is, 
1  On various forms of empirical legal research see Dyevre (2010) 297.
2  Vromen (2010) 249.
3  Sartori (2009).
4  Pócza (2015).
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however, more than obvious that the legal model is no longer tenable. Judges are not simply 
the “mouth of the law” as Montesquieu put it. Various research methods on judicial behavior 
have been shooting up from the second half of the 20th century and the legal model has 
been clearly discredited at least in the US literature.5 General overviews on methodologies 
have been provided by Hönnige and Dyevre who argue also that the legal model is less 
relevant than before in empirical legal research.6 Our approach should be clearly 
distinguished from the legal model, but in contrast to the attitudinal or strategic models, the 
methodological approach of this paper doesn’t ignore the justifi cations of decisions given 
by judges.
Given that the legal model is outmoded, focusing on the role perception of the judges 
is more pressing. If judges are not only the “mouth of the law” then what else are they? 
What is the job they are doing? How do they perceive themselves and their role? These are 
relevant questions which have been most recently dealt with by some scholars who turned 
back the focus once again on what judges said and how they argued (either in their decisions 
or in interviews and scientifi c articles).7 This approach might be labelled as a neo-
institutionalist approach which is not a naïve one like the legal model but in contrast to the 
attitudinal, legal realist or strategic models it stresses the importance of arguments given by 
the judges in their decisions. Robertson’s essential point is “that if so many judges 
worldwide spend so much time arguing with each other, and act as though these arguments 
matter to them, they ought to be taken at face value.”8 Although he did not give an even 
more persuading argument for the primacy of his research approach we are more optimistic 
regarding an enterprise which takes judges’ reasoning and argumentations at face value. A 
combination of neo-institutionalism and discourse analysis seems to be a viable 
methodological approach which contextualizes the speech-acts of judges by locating them 
on a conceptual map.
Neo-institutionalism means in this context that the position of judges within democratic 
systems might infl uence their decisions.9 Robertson quotes James March and Johan Olsen: 
“The simple behavioral proposition is that, most of the time humans take reasoned action 
by trying to answer three elementary questions: What kind of a situation is this? What kind 
of a person am I? What does a person such as I do in a situation such as this?”10 In this 
sense all political actors should consider their own role within an institutional context. This 
type of role perception accompanies all political acts and actors. How decisive these role 
perceptions are in terms of decision making at constitutional courts is rather irrelevant from 
our point of view since justifi cations of decisions become a part of a more general discourse.
Our aim is to provide a tool for mapping the arguments within the constitutional and 
democratic discourse. This is the point where the discourse analysis as a methodological 
approach gains relevance.11 Doing this job might be a necessary but also suffi cient condition 
to have a clearer picture of the relationship between democratic theory and constitutional 
adjudication.
  5  On the legal model see Segal et al. (2002).
  6  Hönnige (2010) 346; Dyevre (2010) 297. 
  7  Robertson (2010).
  8  Robertson (2010) 26.
  9  On neo-institutionalism see March et al. (1989).
10  Robertson (2010) 20.
11  On discourse analysis see Gee (2011).
Ajur2.indb   201 2015.09.25.   13:29:42
202 KÁLMÁN PÓCZA
Analyzing constitutional adjudication from the perspective of democratic theory is not 
a totally unfamiliar approach. Nevertheless, up until the present time, no comprehensive 
overview has been written on this issue. Since democratic theories concentrate largely on 
institutions all of them have (mainly strong) views on constitutional review and various 
patterns of constitutional adjudication. Since democratic theories are normative in their 
nature they argue mainly from one perspective in favor of (or against) a certain type of 
constitutional adjudication.12 On the other hand, comprehensive introductions to various 
types of democratic theories do not concentrate on the specifi c topic of constitutional 
review.13 This is why a comprehensive overview on constitutional review as viewed from 
the perspective of various democratic theories still has not been written. This paper offers a 
sketch of such a comprehensive overview.
2. TYPES OF DEMOCRATIC THEORIES
Variegation of democratic theories might shock scholars who want to have a clear picture 
and give a systematic overview of the relationship between democratic theories and 
constitutional adjudication. Separating positive, empirical, and normative types of 
democratic theories might help us to tidy up the fi eld. Buchstein and Jörke argue that 
positive theories of democracy try to avoid any normative evaluation and do not orientate to 
any existing democracies, but rather they try to grasp how democracy really works. They 
state that “they do not involve empirical study of the workings of real democracies but 
rather are deductive theories of political processes under constructed conditions, such as the 
rationality of agents or the closed logic of functional systems.”14 Such theories are 
Schumpeter’s theory on political elite, Luhman’s systems theory or all democratic theories 
which apply rational choice theories.15 These theories construct formal models of the 
democratic process but do not get involved with empirical studies.
By contrast, empirical democratic theories try to rank political systems according to a 
scale of democratic values and institutions or to determine the necessary functional 
preconditions of democratic systems and measure how such systems perform.16 Quality of 
democracy indexes and measuring the performance of democracies are examples of these 
types of democratic theories. These theories compile various lists and indicators which 
might serve as a theoretical and conceptual basis for empirical assessments. Selecting 
certain types of indicators is, however, not a value neutral process. This is why all empirical 
democratic theories explicitly or implicitly apply one or another model of normative 
democratic theories.
The starting point of all normative democratic theories are the value-laden corner-
stones which provide the reference points of all expectations regarding existing democracies. 
There is a legion of normative theories but as we are interested in evaluating real existing 
types of democracies we focus only on those democratic theories which underpin 
normatively real existing democracies’ institutions and practices. Let’s call these types of 
12  Dworkin (1996); Kis (2000); Tóth (2009).
13  Held (2006); Cunningham (2002).
14  Buchstein et al. (2011) 575.
15  Schumpeter (1994); Luhman (2012).
16  Buchstein et al. (2011) 574.
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democratic theories empirically oriented normative theories. The principal interest of these 
normative theories focuses on the question “who should decide in what kind of procedure?”17
But one can get lost even among normative democratic theories which have been 
embodied in one of the existing democracies after WWII. This is why unifying all 
empirically oriented normative theories in one multidimensional model of democracy seems 
to be the best solution to have a clear picture of democracy and democratic theories. A 
multidimensional model of democracy seems to be the most promising also for our 
purposes, i.e. to make an overview of the relationship between democratic theories and 
constitutional review.
3. MULTIDIMENSIONAL MODEL OF DEMOCRACY
As struggles around the exact meaning of the term democracy have not ceased since the 
concept emerged in antiquity it is worth summing up the different meanings of the term in 
one multidimensional model of democracy. This model served as a theoretical focus point 
of worldwide empirical research conducted by Coppedge et al.18
According to this model democracy has a core concept broadly understood as the 
minimal concept of democracy. This common core, which has been also called minimalist 
or the Schumpeterian concept of democracy, relies on the idea of a fair democratic election. 
According to this view the one and only requirement of democracy is holding free and fair 
elections. Of course, many additional factors might be regarded as important for ensuring 
and enhancing electoral contestation, e.g. civil liberties, freedom of the press, independent 
judiciary, rule of law, and so on. Nevertheless, these factors have been regarded as secondary 
to electoral institutions.
While sharing this common core, empirically oriented normative theories diverge on 
additional but still necessary conditions of democracy. By surveying the literature of 
democratic theories it is not impossible, however, to differentiate between six models or 
core dimensions of democracy. These are the following dimensions: liberal, consensual, 
deliberative, egalitarian, participatory and majoritarian-representative. The relationship 
between these adjectives is neither fully conjunctive nor totally disjunctive: they have some 
common features and overlaps but they differ on crucial points as regards the necessary 
requirements of democracy. Their relations could be demonstrated as follows.
17  The preferences in terms of institutional arrangements (“Which institutional design fi ts best 
to the expected decision making process?”) are not always unambiguous hence traditional 
categorization of democracies (presidential, parliamentary, etc.) might be useless in this regard.
18  Coppedgeetal et al (2011) 247 et al and 159.
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Figure 1. Multidimensional model of democracy
Adapted from Coppedge et al. 2011
I think the terms used here speak almost for themselves. Nevertheless, by relying on 
the theoretical considerations of the empirical research conducted by Coppedge et al. one 
could sum up schematically the special characteristics of the six dimensions by referring to 
ideals, the most important questions and most important institutions of specifi c democratic 
theories, which serve as a fundament for each dimension. As mentioned above, electoral 
democratic theories urge fair elections and the central question they put forward reads as 
follows: Are important government offi ces fi lled by free and fair multiparty elections before 
a broad electorate? Special institutions important for these democratic theories include 
electoral systems and political parties.
The ideal democracies of liberal theories are those in which governments are limited, 
a vast number of veto points are built into the system, a wide range of various institutions 
of checks and balances constrains the legislative and executive branches of government, 
and individual liberty is pronouncedly protected. The focal point of the liberal democratic 
theories lies in the question of whether the power of the majority, as revealed in legislation 
or the executive, is constrained to an appropriate extent and individual rights are guaranteed 
adequately. Preferred institutions are independent bodies (like media, interest groups and 
civil society) and constitutional courts.
By contrast, majoritarian theories insist on the rule of the majority without any 
institutional constraint and stress the relevance of vertical accountability by means of 
democratic elections. Power should be centralized and not dispersed and the competition of 
political parties makes democracy work.
Consensual theories of democracy emphasize the signifi cance of power sharing and 
the essential need for multiple veto points. The central question of these theories reads as 
follows: “How numerous, independent, and diverse are the groups and institutions that 
participate in policymaking?” Since consensual democratic theories highlight the most 
relevant groups of the society, institutions like federalism, proportional electoral system, 
oversized cabinets and an extreme multi-party system are preferred.
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Participatory and deliberative theories share the view that democracy consists of 
government by discussion. Nevertheless, participatory democratic theories stress more the 
direct democratic elements, the active participation of a wide range of the population and 
focuses on local governments. Deliberative democratic theories are less keen on the 
decision making processes by direct involvement of the population and draw attention 
rather to the public and reasonable discussion before decisions are taken. Deliberative 
democracies are particularly interested in freedom and plurality of media.
Last but not least, egalitarian democratic theories focus on outcomes of democratic 
processes and seek equal distribution of power among the citizens. Institutions which could 
guarantee this equal distribution include health care systems, public schools and tax 
systems. All this can be summed up in a table as follows:
Table 1. Characteristics of the democratic theories
I. Electoral
Ideals: Contestation, competition
Question: Are important government offi ces fi lled
by free and fair multiparty elections before a broad electorate?
Institutions: Elections, political parties, competitiveness, suffrage, turnover
II. Liberal
Ideals: Limited government, individual liberty, 
rule of law
Question: Is power constrained and individual 
rights guaranteed?
Institutions: Civil  liberties, independent bodies 
(media, interest groups, judiciary), constitutional 
courts
III. Majoritarian
Ideals: Majority rule, vertical accountability
Question: Does the majority rule?
Institutions: Consolidated and centralized, with 
special focus on the role of political parties
IV. Consensual
Ideals: Power sharing, multiple veto points
Question: How numerous, independent, and 
diverse are the groups and institutions that 
participate in policymaking?
Institutions: Federalism, separate powers, PR, 
supermajorities, oversized cabinets, large party 
system
V. Participatory
Ideals: Direct, active participation in decision-
making by the people
Question: Do citizens participate in political 
decision making?
Institutions: voting, consultation, civil society, 
local government, direct democracy
VI. Deliberative
Ideals: Government by reason
Question: Are political decisions the product of 
public deliberation?
Institutions: Media, hearings, panels, other 
deliberative bodies
VII. Egalitarian
Ideals: Equal distribution of power among citizens
Question: Are all citizens equally empowered?
Institutions: Income, health, education, and other 
indicators of empowerment
Adapted from Coppedge et al. 2011
Since our aim is to apply the multidimensional model of democracy and not to discuss 
its virtues or defi ciencies, even less the weaknesses of a schematic approach, let me proceed 
to the application of this model.19
19  For a less concise summary of the dimensions see Pócza (2015).
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4. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DIMENSIONS OF DEMOCRACY
Our research does not survey all aspects of these democratic theories and dimensions 
but selects one question and gives an overview of the tenets of democratic theories on 
constitutional review. What follows might give the reader only superfi cial impressions on 
the topic, however, a more comprehensive study will be published as mentioned above. By 
compiling this overview I mostly relied on the works of the most important scholars who 
might be called representatives of the particular democratic theory.
By differentiating between two core types of constitutional adjudication, strong and 
weak, we can locate the six dimensions or types of democratic theories on a scale which 
attributes positive or negative attitudes towards constitutional review.
Figure 2. Judicial review and dimensions of democracy
On the left-wing end of the scale we fi nd the liberal dimension, which defi nitely 
advocates strong forms of judicial review and judicial activism. On the right-wing end we 
fi nd the majoritarian-representative dimension, which refutes the very existence of the 
strong form of judicial review and any form of judicial activism while occasionally 
admitting the applicability of the weak form of review. The other four dimensions could be 
located somewhere in between these two extreme positions.
The position of the liberal dimension and democratic theory is perhaps the most 
elaborated and unambiguous: constitutional courts should be considered as bulwarks against 
the tyranny of the majority which is, in turn, the most signifi cant danger for democracy.20 
By defending effectively individual rights courts play a crucial role in the theory of liberal 
democracy. Constitutional courts are forums of principles where arguments clash with 
arguments and decisions will refl ect the outcome of a rational debate. Courts are most 
appropriate for defending individual rights and deciding on diffi cult issues because judges, 
in contrast to MPs and other political actors, follow a principled and not an interest-based 
reasoning. Beyond this principled reasoning the most signifi cant and decisive a priori 
argument for establishing constitutional courts with wide competences is that they are 
bound not only to give exhaustive reasoning but also to remain consistent. Consistency 
might be a conclusive argument and has been considered also as a differentia specifi ca of 
20  Dworkin (1996); Kis (2000); Tóth (2009).
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constitutional courts in comparison to other deliberative assemblies. Since predictability of 
the courts’ decisions is one of the most important components of legal certainty (rule of 
law) courts cannot deviate as easily from former decisions as other political actors.21 
According to the theory of liberal or constitutional democracy courts are in charge of 
protecting individual rights by consistent reasoning.
Turning to the consensual dimension and democratic theory, fi rstly we have to premise 
that this dimension is badly under-theorized with regard to constitutional adjudication and 
has a rather ambiguous attitude towards constitutional review. The consensual democratic 
theory is comfortable with both strong judicial review and with the denial of any form of it 
in spite of the fact that constitutional courts were not constitutive elements of consensual 
democracies in the ‘70s and ‘80s. Arend Lijphart was convinced that constitutional courts 
could play a positive role in a consensual democracy by providing a further forum for 
balancing and compromising interests of different interest groups.22 The most recent 
literature is, however, rather skeptical in this regard. McCrudden and van der Schiff point 
out eventual detrimental side-effects of constitutional adjudication in a society which is 
based on a fragile balance between the most signifi cant groups.23 Constitutional courts 
could blow up this fragile balance between the leading groups of a society by insisting on 
the protection of individual rights even in case of a confl ict between individual rights and 
some practices of consensual democracy. Consensual democratic theory concentrates on the 
most signifi cant groups of the society and prefers to maintain balance between these groups. 
The theory’s main concern is these groups and not the marginalized individuals. 
Consequently an intransigent constitutional court which protects marginalized individual’s 
rights is rather a ballast of consensual democracy and not a paramount institution of it. By 
contrast, a court which protects group rights might be favored by adherents of consensual 
democracy. Since consensual democracies have been frequently established in post-confl ict 
societies where delicate and fragile balances guarantee the existence and the cohesion of the 
political community, advocates of consensual democracy might contest the need for 
constitutional courts and constitutional adjudication.
As for the deliberative theory in its original version, presented by Jürgen Habermas, it 
is also rather skeptical concerning the virtues of constitutional review.24 Habermas 
acknowledges that courts have to argue very profoundly and by doing this the quality of 
their arguments could contribute to enhancement of the quality of public discussion. But he 
challenges this type of argumentation and argues that constitutional review might lead to 
legalistic deliberations, which is a rather heavy constraint on the political community. The 
formal-legalistic language of constitutional courts’ decisions averts the focus of deliberation 
from the substance of the topic.25 This is why classical proponents of deliberative democracy 
cast doubts on the benefi ts of constitutional courts and are inclined to constrain the 
institution to control the process of deliberation. Both Habermas and John Hart Ely were 
convinced that constitutional courts should not be part of the deliberation and decision 
making processes of the political community.26 The role of the courts should be confi ned to 
guaranteeing fair procedural framework for the deliberation and must not have the last say 
21  Kis (2000) 186.
22  Lijphart (1999); Popelier (2013) 499.
23  McCrudden (2013) 477; Habermas (1996); van der Schiff (2010); McCrudden et al. (2013).
24  Habermas (1996).
25  Habermas (1996) 274.
26  Ely (1980).
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on any substantial political issues. Adherents of deliberative democracy seek open debates 
with as many participants as possible. But constitutional courts are aristocratic bodies, 
which negotiate behind closed doors in order to maintain their authority. Constitutional 
courts are paternalistic institutions, which might not promote the issue of a wide ranging 
deliberation.
Nevertheless, recent attempts try to fi nd a way in which even a strong form of 
constitutional review might be harmonized with the theory of deliberative democracy. Cass 
Sunstein’s idea of judicial minimalism has been one of the most promising in this regard. 
Sunstein argues that judicial decisions should be as narrow and as shallow as possible. 
Judges should decide only the cases before the court and should not set down broad rules 
(narrowness). Furthermove, minimalist judges try to avoid issues of basic principles by 
reaching “incompletely theorized agreements” (shallowness).27 Judges should focus on the 
case before the court and decide it without referring to abstract principles because this 
judicial mentality leaves the most important and controversial questions open for further 
discussion and does not narrow down the scope of deliberation. Another effort, which tries 
to reconcile constitutional review with deliberative democratic theory, defi ned several 
criteria of constitutional adjudication which might explicitly improve the quality of the 
general deliberative process.28 Before taking decisions courts should organize open hearings 
to collect as many arguments as possible. Rules of decision making should facilitate debate 
among judges. What kind of rules could promote rational deliberation of judges depends, 
however, on context and cannot be predetermined a priori. Mendes suggests different rules 
for different constellations. After the decision has been taken courts should publish 
concurring and dissenting opinions, and the justifi cation of decisions should refer to the 
possibility of being wrong. There are a number of further criteria which should be 
considered but the main goal should be always to promote deliberation among citizens.
The egalitarian democratic theory’s attitude towards constitutional review is 
instrumental: if constitutional courts facilitate the process of on-going improvement of the 
welfare of citizens, the existence of constitutional courts might be legitimate. By contrast, if 
constitutional courts block the program of expansive redistribution their legitimacy remains 
doubtful. One of the most important proponents of this idea, Sotirios Barber, argues that a 
constitution and its interpretation must serve the most important aim of a political 
community, which is the welfare of the citizens. In his most recent book Barber uses the 
term constitutional failure to describe a situation in which political institutions (including 
constitutional courts) could not achieve this aim.29 Constitutional courts fail also if they are 
not able or willing to enforce social rights. Therefore, enforcing social rights by 
constitutional adjudication might be a central issue of egalitarian democratic theory. 
Nevertheless, egalitarian democratic theories doubt in general that constitutional courts’ 
judges are inclined to protect social rights since the dominant view in legal scholarship and 
among judges is that social rights are not enforceable. Enforcing social rights would be an 
interference with legislation since decisions on welfare services have serious fi nancial 
consequences. Judges are not responsible for the budget of the country, as pointed out by 
opponents of Barber’s thesis. According to another egalitarian scholar, Mark Tushnet, this 
program might be accomplished by a combination of strong social rights with weak courts.30 
27  Sunstein (2001) 10.
28  Mendes (2013).
29  Barber (2014).
30  Tushnet (2008).
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Tushnet argues that the success of social rights depends not on the strength of the courts but 
on the strength of soc ial rights included in a constitution. This means that constitutional 
courts are bound to enforce social rights explicitly articulated in the constitution. Weak 
courts are simply empowered to propose certain kinds of interpretation of social rights not 
explicitly mentioned in the constitution but legislation will have the last say on these 
issues.31 Weak courts cannot annul legislative acts even if they have the competence to 
review them. This type of constitutional review is based on a dialogue between courts and 
other branches of government and assumes that decisions of constitutional courts may have 
a serious impact on public discourse even if legislative acts could not be declared void by 
them. Weak courts, which protect or even promote a wide range of social rights, do not 
imply direct risks for the budget but advance the issue of a fair and more egalitarian 
society.32
Turning to the fi fth type of democratic theory we will face even more powerful 
misgivings about the usefulness of constitutional courts. As participatory theory advocates 
the inclusion of ordinary citizens in as many processes of decision making as possible, 
proponents of participatory democracy mistrust all elite institutions. Constitutional courts 
are pronouncedly such institutions.33 They declare their decisions ex cathedra without 
getting involved in a broad discussion with the public sphere. Excluding ordinary citizens 
from deliberation and decision making processes concerning the most fundamental issues 
of a political community is perhaps one of the most serious vices according to the 
proponents of participatory democracy. Participatory democratic theories trust in ordinary 
citizens’ mental capacity. They argue that there is not any difference between judges and 
ordinary citizens as regards their moral capacities. Since constitutional questions are 
essentially moral questions and not formal-legalistic questions there is no reason why 
citizens should be excluded from decisions of the highest importance. Since judges have no 
special moral capacities, rational and pervasive disagreement about the ends of a society 
will prevail also among judges. If this is the case there is no legitimate argument why 
judges should decide moral questions and not the people. Constitutional questions, like 
other political questions, do not have one fi nal answer or solution, thus decisions taken 
directly by the people might be reopened and discussed in the public sphere and by public 
involvement. By contrast, decisions of the constitutional courts seem to be eternal or less 
appropriate for boosting further debate among the population. In the US context some 
“popular constitutionalists” argue that challenging the Supreme Court’s competence in 
having the last say had been customary until the ‘60s.34 Until then the American electorate 
and the political elite resisted more or less effectively the efforts of the SC to expand its 
competence. Today criticizing the decisions of the Supreme Court is quite common but 
challenging the competence of the SC to decide important issues is no longer acceptable in 
the US. According to Kramer this is one of the biggest problems with American democracy 
and his main aspiration is to regain the power for the people to decide in every case.35
Finally, majoritarian democratic theories worry about the well-known counter-
majoritarian diffi culty, which emerged by the spread of constitutional review and judicial 
activism. According to the proponents of the majoritarian democratic theory the hope to 
31  Tushnet (2008).
32  Tushnet (2008) 253.
33  Tully (2007) 334; Tully (2002) 204; Puchalska (2011); Blokker (2013).
34  Kramer (2004).
35  Kramer (2004) 231.
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fi nd agreement on the most important (constitutional issues) is illusionary.36 People disagree 
profoundly on basic questions, thus consensus might not be achieved even among citizens 
with similar cultural backgrounds. Only a modus vivendi might work in modern societies. 
Regarding constitutional review, they see no reason why constitutional judges could reach a 
consensus if the cases they have to deal with are concerned with the same moral issues on 
which there is no agreement among ordinary citizens. Rational disagreement cannot be 
eliminated, as this is the one and most essential characteristic of modern pluralist societies. 
If this is the case the one and only legitimate decision making process is the majority rule. 
Consequently, proponents of majoritarian democracy deny the legitimacy of constitutional 
courts as institutions which violate the principle of majority and equality embodied in the 
democratic decision making principle “one man one vote”. Furthermore, the argument that 
constitutional courts would serve as bulwarks against tyranny of the majority fails as well. 
Empirical data shows that most of the time constitutional courts’ decisions overlap with the 
view of the majority. On the other hand, tyranny of the majority is almost inconceivable in 
modern pluralist societies, where majorities consist of ever shifting coalitions of various 
minority groups.37 Empirical evidence demonstrates that minority protection has been by 
far more effective in countries without constitutional courts and review (like the UK) than 
in the US where strong form of judicial review existed.38 Empirical evidence shows also 
that the thesis that argumentation and reasoning of constitutional courts are of higher quality 
is seriously deceptive since argumentations of constitutional courts are mostly legalistic and 
do not concern the essence or substance of the issue.39 Last but not least majoritarian 
opponents of constitutional review underline that decision making processes are based on 
the majority rule even in constitutional courts, consequently the decision making process in 
constitutional courts would also be exposed to the alleged tyranny of the majority (of the 
judges).40
5. CONCLUSION
Keeping in mind this overview of the six possible dimensions of democracy along with 
their implications for the legitimacy of constitutional review we should conclude that the 
different dimensions might have divergent a priori views on constitutional courts and 
constitutional adjudication. But how should we relate these fi ndings to the question of the 
quality of judicial reasoning? It seems to be quite a simple task: by studying decisions, 
concurring and/or dissenting opinions of constitutional courts one could fi gure out trends in 
attitudes of judges towards one of these democratic dimensions which could provide clear 
evidence on the self-understanding and role perception of judges and courts within the 
democratic system and the system of checks and balances.
I admit that this highly concise outline of democratic dimensions’ approach to 
constitutional adjudication has been completely rudimentary. Nevertheless, I am convinced 
that creating a strong and explicit link between democratic theory and constitutional 
adjudication could improve the quality of judicial reasoning since it expresses the role 
perception and the self-understanding of a court or a judge. Although by exposing their 
36  Bellamy (2007) 16, 20; Waldron (1999).
37  Bellamy (2007) 37, 43.
38  Bellamy (2007) 44.
39  Waldron (2006) 1353.
40  Waldron (2006) 1396.
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self-perceptions judges reveal some of their assumptions and attitudes beyond the law, at 
the same time they create a standard of evaluation of judgments. Standards might differ, 
consequently evaluation might also differ, but consequent application of standards, however 
different they might be, is even better than inconsequent role perception. This is how 
democratic theory could contribute to the improvement of judicial reasoning.
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